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The paper examines the value of managerial discretion in financial reporting
by exploring the value relevance of intangible assets acquired in business combina-
tions (AIA) before and after the 2008 International Financial Reporting Standard
(IFRS) 3 amendment. The 2008 IFRS 3 amendment gave managers the discretion
to recognize previously unrecognized intangibles in the target firm, hence, we posit
that if managerial discretion improves the quality of financial reporting, we should
observe an increase in the value relevance of AIA after the amendment. Our em-
pirical analysis is based on a dataset of 603 mergers announced between 2004 to
2016, across 7 African countries. Consistent with our main hypothesis, we find that
the value relevance of AIA, predominantly acquired goodwill (AGW), increased af-
ter the amendment, suggesting that managerial discretion improves the quality of
financial information. Importantly, we highlight a caveat to this argument by show-
ing that the value of discretion is moderated by the underlying institutional quality,
with the value relevance of AIA being greater in high-quality institutional contexts.
Our findings are robust to alternative measures of AIA, alternative models for test-
ing value relevance and various controls for endogeneity. Overall, our findings have
important implications for accounting standard-setters, governments, investors and
practitioners.
Keywords : Managerial discretion, IFRS 3, acquired intangible assets, business combina-
tions, institutional quality, Africa.
1 Introduction
Financial reporting standards, whether based on generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) or international financial reporting standards (IFRS), are characterised by a
multiplicity of financial reporting choices1 that provide managers with some discretion
to exercise judgement when preparing financial statements (Perotti & Windisch, 2017;
Tucker & Zarowin, 2006). The moral hazard associated with the separation of ownership
from control in modern corporations (Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995; Sirén et al., 2018)
can be exacerbated if managers exercise this discretion in an opportunistic rather than an
efficient manner (Bowen et al., 2008; Hadani et al., 2015). Despite the associated moral
hazard, managerial discretion offers several benefits, particularly in the area of financial
reporting (Demski et al., 1984; Morck et al., 1990). For instance, Verrecchia (1986)
argues that managerial discretion may permit managers to choose reporting options that
legitimately reduce corporate tax liability and regulatory costs, and hence, increase firm
value. Importantly, financial markets rely on information in financial reports (Verrecchia,
1986). Thus, the flexibility inherent in managerial discretion over accounting policy
choices can improve the price formation process by allowing managers to convey relevant
private information about their firm to investors (Holthausen & Watts, 2001; Kothari,
2001; Perotti & Windisch, 2017).
Consequently, a number of empirical studies (Bowen et al., 2008; Perotti & Windisch,
2017; Subramanyam, 1996; Tucker & Zarowin, 2006) have examined whether managerial
discretion relating to financial reporting alternatives are value relevant. For example,
Tucker & Zarowin (2006) report that managerial discretion relating to accruals improves
the informativeness of future earnings. Similarly, Subramanyam (1996) and Perotti &
Windisch (2017) find that managerial discretion in relation to accruals is positively as-
sociated with informational efficiency, whilst Bowen et al. (2008) report that increased
accounting discretion arising from poor governance practices impacts positively on future
1Examples include accruals, asset impairment and amortization, stock valuation and treatment of
manufacturing costs.
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returns. Discernibly, these studies have not only examined a limited number of finan-
cial reporting choice (e.g., accruals) often with mixed results (e.g., Dechow et al., 2010;
Holthausen & Watts, 2001; Kothari, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001), but also mainly focused on
developed countries (e.g., UK and US), and thereby arguably impairing a complete un-
derstanding of the value relevance of managerial discretion relating to financial reporting
choices.
Thus, our study broadly seeks to contribute to the literature by exploring whether
managers exercise discretion in financial reporting in an opportunistic or efficient man-
ner by identifying the conditions under which managerial discretion improves financial
reporting or not. Specifically, we deviate from the literature which largely draws ev-
idence from accruals (Dechow et al., 2010; Holthausen & Watts, 2001; Kothari, 2001;
Perotti & Windisch, 2017; Subramanyam, 1996; Verrecchia, 2001) by examining evidence
relating to the reporting of intangibles acquired during business combinations—acquired
intangible assets (AIA)2. Further, while prior research largely focuses on the relation-
ship between managerial discretion and (internal) corporate governance quality (Bowen
et al., 2008; Gong et al., 2016), we explore how the quality of a firm’s (external) institu-
tional environment may impact opportunistic behaviour associated with managerial dis-
cretion.Specifically, we argue that, besides internal corporate governance systems (Bowen
et al., 2008; Dong & Gou, 2010), strong external institutions can play an important role
by incentivising managers to use their discretion to improve the quality of reported finan-
cial information (efficient manner) rather than to extract private benefits (opportunistic
manner).
In recent years, corporate intangibles have become more important in financial report-
ing due to significant growth in information technology and the resulting development of
technology-related assets. The debate on the value relevance of intangible assets stems
from the fact that, unlike other physical assets, intangible assets are largely knowledge-
based assets without physical substance and thus, are usually unique to firms (Basu &
2Acquired intangible assets (AIA) refer to intangible assets acquired during business combinations.
We also use the phrases; ‘business combinations’, and ‘mergers and acquisitions’, interchangeably.
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Waymire, 2008; Skinner, 2008).3 Valuing such assets, particularly those acquired from
other firms (including intangible assets that may previously have been unrecognized by
these acquiree or target firms) as required by IFRS 3, poses a challenge. This challenge
is partly due to the existence of information asymmetry between the acquirer and target
firms during business combinations. This, therefore, represents one aspect of financial re-
porting for which managerial discretion in financial reporting might be critical. Although
accounting standard-setters (particularly, the International Accounting Standards Board,
IASB) have responded to this challenge with several amendments to existing standards,
little is known about the effects of these amendments4 on the value relevance of AIA.
The 2008 IFRS 3 amendment, in particular, afforded acquiring managers the discretion
to recognize previously unrecognized intangibles in the target or acquiree firm, yet it is
unclear whether this additional managerial discretion has improved the informativeness
of reported values. We, therefore, examine the importance of managerial discretion in
this novel setting by testing whether the amendment improved the informativeness of
AIA.
Additionally, the influence of the underlying institutional environment on the conse-
quences of managerial discretion in financial reporting also remains unexplored. This is,
perhaps, due to the fact that prior studies exploring managerial discretion tend to focus
on a single country context, mainly the US (Bowen et al., 2008; Perotti & Windisch, 2017;
Tucker & Zarowin, 2006). These studies (e.g. Bowen et al., 2008; Dong & Gou, 2010)
consider the influences of internal firm-level corporate governance factors on managerial
discretion, but ignore the influence of external institutions. Our study thus contributes
to the existing literature by addressing this research gap. Specifically, we adopt a cross-
country approach that allows us to explore the importance of the underlying institutional
quality (IQ), which varies across countries. Besides the advantage of generating more
3That is, there are usually no suitable comparators trading outside the firm in arms-length transac-
tions.
4The limited number of studies that exist in this area have focused on goodwill impairments and
their implications, as well as the post-acquisition firm performance effects of AIA (Hamberg & Beisland,
2014; Hamberg et al., 2011; Su & Wells, 2015), rather than the value relevance of the acquirers’ total
intangible assets, which often include both goodwill and other acquired intangible assets.
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generalisable results, a cross-country approach can produce more powerful statistical re-
sults by exploiting time-series, as well as cross-sectional variations at both the firm- and
country-levels.
The African continent, in particular, presents an interesting setting to examine the
value relevance of managerial discretion relating to AIA for a number of reasons. First,
over the last decade, Africa has experienced increased growth in mergers and acquisitions
(M&As) activities (Mergermarket, 2016; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016). According to Thomson
Reuters database, since 1999, Africa has doubled its share of global M&As, resulting
in about $35 and $25 billion in announced deals in 2014 and 2016 alone, respectively
(Thomson Reuters, 2014, 2016). This surge in M&A deals is expected to continue (Ellis
et al., 2015; Mergermarket, 2016). Second, despite the wide convergence of IFRS around
the world, debates persist on its relevance to developing countries (particularly, those in
Africa), as they are often underlined by weak institutions and enforcement mechanisms
that can impact negatively on the effectiveness of IFRS adoption. Amongst the 6 conti-
nents for which World Governance Indicator data is available5, Africa reports the lowest
aggregate level of IQ.6 Nonetheless, as shown in Table 1, even within Africa, the levels
of IQ differ markedly across countries. This allows us to contribute to the literature
by exploring the extent to which relatively strong external institutions play a role in
ensuring that managers use their discretion to improve the quality of reported financial
information.
Our paper makes three distinct contributions. Firstly, we develop and propose a
simple framework to estimate AIA for a large sample of firms. Our framework extracts
AIA from time series data relating to total intangibles. The alternative to estimating
AIA from reported intangibles is the use of merger premiums, as in Su & Wells (2015) or
relying on hand-collected data from notes to financial statements. This new framework
5World Governance Indicators (WGI) are provided by Kaufmann et al. (2010) and is freely obtainable
from the World Bank Database. The data used covers the period from 2004 to 2016. We discuss this
data in more detail in the data section of the study.
6By our estimates, between 2004 and 2016, the average WGI is -0.672 for Africa, -0.354 for Asia,
-0.041 for South America, 0.232 for Oceania, 0.422 for North America and 0.764 for Europe.
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should, thus, support further research on AIA under IFRS 3.
Secondly, we document the importance of managerial discretion in financial reporting
by exploring the value relevance of AIA before and after the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment.
The 2008 IFRS 3 amendment afforded managers the discretion to recognize previously
unrecognized intangible assets by the acquired firms. We find that AIA was not value
relevant before the 2008 amendment, but was value relevant after the amendment, sug-
gesting that investors appear to value, in particular, the managerial discretion offered to
acquirers under the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment, to recognize AIA not previously recognized
by target firms.
Thirdly, our African setting characterised by institutional voids and generally weak IQ
presents a unique environment to explore how the underlying institutional environment
moderates the importance of managerial discretion. Specifically, we explore whether IQ
moderates the value relevance of AIA after the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment. Importantly, we
find that the value relevance of AIA post-2008 IFRS 3 amendment, is stronger in country-
years with high underlying IQ. This contributes to the existing literature by highlighting
the role of the external institutional environment on the value relevance of accounting
information. Overall, our results are robust to the choice of model, the estimation of
acquired intangibles, self-selection bias and several endogeneity issues.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature
and develops the hypotheses of interest, section 3 presents the data and methodology,
and section 4 discusses our findings, whilst section 5 concludes the study.
2 Literature review and hypotheses development
2.1 Accounting for acquired intangible assets
In Africa, the accounting treatment for AIA mainly followed the recommendations of the
International Accounting Standards (IAS 22 – Accounting for Business Combinations)
even prior to the adoption of IFRS by African countries (Eloff & de Villiers, 2015; Powell,
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2003). IAS 22 was superseded by IFRS 3 – Business Combinations in March 2004 and
became effective for business combinations with agreement date after 30th March 2004
(IASB, 2008b). The release of IFRS 3 in 2004 coincided with a revision of IAS 36 –
Impairment of Assets and IAS 38 – Intangible Assets (IASB, 2008b). IFRS 3 made four
far-reaching changes to the accounting for AIA. Firstly, IFRS 3 completely abolished the
pooling of interest method and recommended that all AIA within the remit of IFRS 3,
be accounted for using the purchase method. Secondly, IFRS 3 required that AIA in a
business combination be reported separately from goodwill. Thirdly, IFRS 3 required
all AIA to be reported at fair value rather than at cost. Finally, IFRS 3 prohibited the
amortization of AIA in favor of annual impairment testing subject to IAS 36 (IASB,
2008b). These changes were expected to increase the informativeness, reliability and
comparability of AIA under IFRS 3.
Another version of IFRS 3 – Business Combinations was issued in January 2008
with an implementation date of July 2009 (IASB, 2008a). This revised version of IFRS 3
made an important change to the accounting for, and recognition of, AIA. Specifically, the
2008 version offers acquiring managers the discretion to recognize identifiable intangible
assets not previously recognized by the acquired firm (Deloitte, 2008). Although this
change has no effect on the accounting treatment of AIA, it may result in more AIA
being recognized in business combination transactions (PWC, 2008). This is because
it offers managers greater discretion in deciding which intangible assets to recognize
in a business combination transaction (PWC, 2008). In this paper, our focus is on
this additional discretion that the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment provides and whether this
discretion translates into more informative financial reports.
2.2 The value relevance of acquired intangible assets
One financial reporting choice that less is known about is value relevance with respect
to the discretion exercised by managers regarding the accounting treatment of intangible
assets. Therefore, the central focus of this study is corporate intangibles, especially
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AIA. Admittedly, a limited number of studies have investigated the value relevance and
decision usefulness of some form of intangible assets to users of accounting information.
However, these studies also mainly focus on the developed markets, as well as general
intangible assets rather than AIA. For example, using Australian data, Barth & Clinch
(1998) report a positive relationship between revalued intangible assets and both market
and non-market-based value estimates. Similarly, Goodwin & Ahmed (2006) find that
Australian firms that capitalize intangible assets have increased value relevance. These
results are discernibly consistent with those of other past studies (Abrahams & Sidhu,
1998; Godfrey & Koh, 2001; Shahwan, 2004) that documented a positive relationship
between intangible assets and market-based value estimates.
In contrast, Godfrey & Koh (2001) document that although goodwill and identifiable
intangibles are value relevant, capitalized research and development are not. Also, Su
& Wells (2015) found that identifiable intangible assets acquired and recognized during
business combinations for a sample of Australian acquirers were not related to post-
acquisition firm performance. Further, the findings of several others (Amir & Lev, 1996;
Beattie, 2005; Collins et al., 1997; Joos & Lang, 1994) have questioned the value relevance
of different items of intangible assets. Dahmash et al. (2009) attribute the conflicting re-
sults to the uniqueness of specific types of intangible assets such that their value relevance
differs significantly from each other.
Thus, given these foregoing empirical findings on the value relevance of intangible as-
sets in general, and the uniqueness of AIA, which results from the business combination
process and the expectation by investors to benefit from the net assets of the acquired
firm post-acquisition, we postulate that irrespective of managerial discretion, AIA should
be value relevant to investors. Hence, our first hypothesis is:
H1: Recognized acquired intangible assets are value relevant.
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2.3 The value relevance of acquired intangible assets after the
2008 IFRS 3 amendment
Other studies have also investigated how intra-jurisdictional changes in accounting stan-
dards may affect the value relevance of intangible assets. Within this stream of literature,
Oliveira et al. (2010) argue that changes in accounting standards may account for dif-
ferences in the value relevance of intangible assets, especially when it is accompanied by
increased managerial discretion. Consistent with this assumption, they investigated the
value relevance of intangibles in Portugal pre- and post-IFRS adoption. They document
that the change from Portuguese GAAP to IFRS had no impact on the value relevance of
intangible assets. Further, their results suggested that the rule contained in IFRS 3 that
allowed companies to subject intangible assets to impairment tests rather than amorti-
zation has improved the value relevance of intangible assets. Their result is consistent
with Eloff & de Villiers (2015), who indicated that goodwill reported according to IFRS
3 is more value relevant than goodwill reported under IAS 22. Similarly, using Swedish
data, Hamberg & Beisland (2014) find that goodwill balances are value relevant under
both the Swedish GAAP and IFRS. However, goodwill impairment is value decreasing
under Swedish GAAP, but insignificant under IFRS. These studies indicate that intra-
jurisdictional changes in accounting standards have value relevance effects on intangible
assets.
Wyatt (2005) attributed the performance effects of intra-jurisdictional changes in ac-
counting standards to changes in managerial discretion. The author argued that when
accounting standards give management greater reporting discretion, intangible assets are
more value relevant and valued by investors7. This is because discretion offers man-
agers credible channels to circumvent legal and institutional barriers associated with the
disclosure of certain private information to shareholders (Demski et al., 1984; Schipper,
7One reason for the increased informativeness of the amended post-2008 IFRS 3 over its 2004 version
is that discerning investors can appreciate that managers have the opportunity to value all intangibles,
including those that might have been previously unrecognized. This, therefore, enhances the possibility
of valuing intangibles at their fair values, and hence, the investments of acquirers.
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1989; Tan & Jamal, 2006). As a result, Dahmash et al. (2009) suggested that accounting
standards with less limiting choice regarding the recognition of intangible assets have
greater value relevance effects. Empirically, AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) reported that
managers capitalize on the increased managerial discretion offered by IFRS 3 to convey
private information about the firm to investors. Similarly, Chambers et al. (2003) found
that managerial discretion over R&D costs recognition increases the value relevance of
R&D expenditures. These studies suggest that accounting standards that offer greater
discretion to preparers increase the value relevance of intangible assets.
We note that the current version of IFRS 3 amended in 2008, made a significant
change to the accounting and recognition of AIA in paragraph 13. This change offers
the managers of the acquiring firms’ greater discretion in the recognition of identifiable
intangible assets (e.g., brand names, patents or customer relationships) that the target
firms’ managers had not previously recognized in their financial statements. The tar-
get firms’ managers will not have previously recognized these assets in their financial
statements because they were developed internally and the associated development costs
charged to expense (Deloitte, 2008; IASB, 2008a). This significant change effected in
the 2008 version of IFRS 3 provides an expectation that the intangible assets recognized
post-acquisition based on the 2008 version of IFRS 3 would be significantly different from
the intangible assets recognized by firms that are non-acquirers or firms that engaged in
business combinations prior to the implementation of the 2008 version of IFRS 3. Thus,
we contend that the greater managerial discretion in the post-2008 IFRS 3 amendment
should result in more AIA being recognized in business combination transactions (PWC,
2008), and arguably should provide more value relevant information about AIA to in-
vestors. Thus, our second hypothesis is:
H2: The information content of AIA is more value relevant after the 2008 IFRS
3 amendment.
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2.4 Institutional quality, IFRS 3 amendment and value relevance
In Africa and other developing countries with institutional settings that feature relatively
weak regulatory environments, poor enforcement mechanisms, illiquid capital markets,
and inefficient stock markets (Bertrand et al., 2002; Ntim et al., 2012; Samaha et al., 2012;
Tunyi & Ntim, 2016), there is an argument that IFRS, as a whole, may not enhance the
value relevance of accounting information of African firms (Bova & Pereira, 2012) due to
the higher level of discretion. Specifically, with regards to IFRS 3, the greater managerial
discretion provided by the 2008 IFRS amendment may render reported AIA less value
relevant due to the potential for managers to exercise this discretion for opportunistic
purposes. Thus, we investigate whether the IQ in the African countries studied has an
impact on the value relevance of AIA post the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment. We expect
to observe that managerial discretion improves the value relevance of AIA only when
underlined by strong institutions. Hence, our third hypothesis is:
H3: Institutional quality positively moderates the value relevance of AIA in Africa
post 2008 IFRS 3 amendment.
3 Data and model development
3.1 Sample selection and data
Our analysis is conducted using a sample of African acquirers. We first generate the list of
all listed firms (live and dead) between 20048 and 2016 across all African stock exchanges.
We obtain a list of 2,516 unique firms. We then collect a panel of financial and accounting
data for these firms (covering the 2004 to 2016 period) from Thomson DataStream.9
Next, we collect our business combination or M&A deal data from Thomson One. We
focus on M&A transactions, which fall within the remit of business combinations as per
8IFRS 3 was effective from 31 March 2004.
9To enhance comparability and avoid currency effects and distortions, we collect our cross-country
data in a single currency—US dollars.
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IFRS 3 (i.e., transactions in which an acquirer obtains control or over 50% voting rights
of one or more businesses). Our dataset covers all M&As completed by African firms
(acquirers) for African and international targets over the period 2004 to 2016. We match
our business combination data to firm-level variables based on DataStream codes and
years. Finally, we obtain information about each country’s year of IFRS adoption from
IFRS Foundation web page (IFRS-Foundation, 2019). We generate a clean sample for
use in our main analysis by making three exclusions;
1. We exclude all firm-year observations with no business combination activity. 10
2. We exclude all firms in countries that had not adopted IFRS by the end of 2016.11
3. For each country, we exclude all firm-year observations prior to the year in which
the country adopts IFRS.12
These exclusions make our research design appropriate for isolating the effect of the 2008
IFRS 3 amendment. After making the exclusions, we are left with a sample of 603 relevant
business combinations across 7 African countries. Table 1 summarises the distribution of
M&A deals across each country and presents information on IFRS adoption years across
each country.
[Insert Table 1 here]
3.2 AIA, IFRS 3 amendment and institutional quality
Documenting the value of reported AIA across firms involved in business combinations
remains a challenge in this line of research. As part of Purchase Price Allocation (PPA),
10In our robustness tests, we use the full sample of all listed firms (acquirers and non-acquirers) in
M&A active countries to address selection bias issues.
11For example, countries such as Tunisia and Ivory Coast (which did not adopt IFRS regulations
before 2016) and Egypt (which allows only foreign companies with dual listing in Egypt to use IFRS
standards) are excluded.
12For example, Nigeria only adopted IFRS in 2010, so we exclude all firm-year observations for
companies in Nigeria prior to 2010.
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IFRS 3 requires firms to allocate the cost of a business combination by recognizing ac-
quired assets at fair value (i.e., identify, value and separately include different AIAs in
the balance sheet). The list of intangibles that can potentially be recognized is exten-
sive13 and disclosure practice varies across firms. Details of intangibles acquired might be
reported in notes to financial statements, but because they are not regularly mandatorily
reported in a specified format, this data is not collated by standard databases, such as
Thomson DataStream, which we use in this study. Some institutions, such as Houlihan
Lokey routinely collect data on the details of PPA (under US GAAP), but this data is
only available for US firms.
One way to address the issue14 is to use hand-collected data. This is laborious,
expensive, impractical in some instances, and may limit the scope of the research. Besides
the issue of cost, several firms (particularly, in Africa) do not routinely disclose AIA
information as a standalone item in their financial statements. An alternative solution
to the problem of AIA data unavailability is to use a suitable proxy. Su & Wells (2015),
for example, use acquisition premiums, as a proxy for AIA. This measure is, at best,
a noisy proxy, as it is unclear to what extent premiums account for AIA in the target
firm, particularly the unrecognized intangibles that the acquirer now has the discretion
to recognize based on the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment. Premiums might also represent
the acquirer’s perception of value to be created through more efficient deployment of the
target’s assets (Tunyi et al., 2019). Event study methodologies could also be used to more
precisely isolate the value relevance of AIA at the time of the deal. Given our African
context, and the inherent illiquidity and stock market efficiency problems, this technique
might prove sub-optimal. Hence, given the need to rely on end of the year (annual)
13This may include, amongst others, marketing-related (e.g., internet domain names, non-compete
agreements, brands, trademarks), customer-related (e.g., contracts, customer lists, and customer re-
lationships), artistic-related (books, musical works, videos, and photographs), contract-based (e.g.,
royalty agreements, licensing, construction permits, broadcasting rights, servicing contracts, employ-
ment contracts, lease agreements, contracts for advertising, construction, management and supply) and
technology-based (e.g., software, databases, trade secrets, patented and unpatented technology) intangi-
bles.
14That is, the unavailability of data on intangibles acquired during business combination in standard
databases.
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figures, we propose a strategy for estimating AIA from routinely reported annual data.
In this study, we estimate AIA as the difference in the acquirer’s total intangible assets
pre- and post-acquisition. in essence, AIA captures the difference between the most recent
value of a firm’s total intangible assets published before a deal is announced and the value
of total intangible assets immediately after the deal is completed. The rationale is that a
significant increase in the acquirer’s intangibles after an acquisition arises primarily due to
intangibles acquired through the acquisition process. We recognize that total intangibles
can grow naturally through firms’ investments, hence, as an extension (in robustness
analysis), we adjust our measure of AIA by subtracting an estimate of each firm’s annual
(natural or expected) growth in intangibles. Our AIA measure has several benefits over
traditional proxies (e.g., acquisition premiums) and hand-collected data. Specifically, it
is easy to compute and it relies on readily available and easily obtainable financial data
(total intangible assets). Additionally, given that it does not involve hand collection, it
allows us to explore a relatively large sample of M&A cases.
For each acquiring firm i at time t, as in equation 1, we estimate AIA as the difference
in total intangibles (net) pre (INTt−1) and post deal completion (INTt), whereby the deal
occurs in a period that lies between t− 1 and t. We deflate this variable by the opening
period number of shares.The pattern or likelihood of intangible impairments may have
changed after the amendment. To remove the impact of such a change, for robustness,
as shown in equation 1a, we add back total impairments of intangibles in year t to our
measure of intangibles in equation 1.15
AIAit = INTt − INTt−1 (1)
AIAit = INTt − INTt−1 + Impairmentst (goodwill and other intangibles) (1a)
A number of studies have explored the value relevance of goodwill arising from business
combinations (Eloff & de Villiers, 2015; Godfrey & Koh, 2001; Hamberg & Beisland,
15Our results are robust to this addition.
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2014; Higson, 1998). Hence, consistent with the literature, we dissociate our measure of
AIA into two components; acquired goodwill (AGW ) and other (non-goodwill) acquired
intangible assets (OAIA). Given that goodwill can only be acquired (but not generated
internally), we estimate AGW as the difference in reported goodwill (net of impairments)
before a deal is announced and reported goodwill (net of impairments) after a deal is
completed (equation 2). Clearly, any significant change in goodwill after an acquisition
is likely to be the result of acquired goodwill. For robustness, as shown in equation 2a,
we also remove the impact of a possible change in the pattern of goodwill impairments
after the amendment by adding back goodwill impairment in year t to our measure of
Goodwill in equation 2.16 As shown in equation 3, OAIA is, therefore, the difference
between AIA and AGW in the year of acquisition. This variable is deflated by opening
period number of shares.
AGWit = Goodwillt −Goodwillt−1 (2)
AGWit = Goodwillt −Goodwillt−1 + Impairments of goodwillt (2a)
OAIAit = AIAt − AGWt (3)
As earlier noted, our measure of AIA implicitly assumes that any change in total in-
tangibles when a deal is completed can be attributed to intangibles acquired during the
acquisition process. It is indeed the case that some firms routinely grow their levels of
intangibles from one year to another by, for example, investing in R&D, amongst oth-
ers. Therefore, our measure might systematically overestimate AIA. To adjust for the
natural growth in intangibles, in our robustness analysis, we assume a normal increase
in intangibles each year, which we approximate as the average yearly change in intangi-
bles (∆INT ) over the last two years. As shown in equation 4, we therefore, adjust our
estimate of acquired intangibles by subtracting the average increase in intangibles over
the last two years. We refer to this adjusted measure as AIA2. As an extension, we also
16Our results are robust to this alternative specification.
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adjust our AIA measure by subtracting the average yearly change in total intangibles in
all prior years until 2004, from AIA. We refer to this adjusted measure as AIA3. Im-
portantly, some firms in our sample have been previously involved in M&A deals. These
previous deals might have resulted in a significant increase in total intangibles. To isolate
this in our analyses, we disregard all previous years with acquisitions when estimating
the natural growth in intangibles. In additional tests, we use adjusted measures of AIA
(i.e., AIA2 and AIA3) to retest our hypotheses.17




Different African countries adopted IFRS standards in different years (see Table 1)
and our data set excludes firm-year observations that do not use IFRS. The IFRS 3 (2008)
amendment has an implementation date of July 2009 (IASB, 2008a) and is applicable
to all Business Combinations from the 2009 financial year. We use an indicator variable
(IFRS3A) to capture the impact of the amendment. IFRS3A takes a value of 1 when
financial year is greater than 2009 and a value of 0 when the financial year is less than
2009.18
Our measure of IQ is derived from Kaufmann et al. (2010) World Governance Indica-
tors (WGIs). Kaufmann et al. (2010) use data from various sources to generate indices,
which measure; Control of Corruption (CCI), Government Effectiveness (GEI), Voice and
Accountability (VAI), Regulatory Quality (RQI), Political Stability and Absence of Vio-
lence (PSAVI) and Rule of Law (ROLI). Kaufmann et al. (2010) link the six measures to
three important governance areas, including: (i) the process by which governments are
selected, monitored and replaced (VAI, PSAVI); (ii) the capacity of the government to
17In general, we find that our conclusions remain unchanged when we use the more complex or
adjusted measures. We also find that there is no statistically significant difference between AIA, AIA2
and AIA3. Hence, for simplicity, we use the simple measure (AIA) dissociated into AGW and OAIA, in
our main analyses and report results for the adjusted measures (AIA2 and AIA3) as part of the battery
of robustness checks we have conducted.
18We exclude 2009 given that this was a transition year. In robustness tests, we have used alternative
definitions which include 2009, and our results are qualitatively similar.
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effectively formulate and implement sound policies (GEI, RQI); and (iii) the respect of
citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions
among them (ROLI, CCI). We use principal component analysis to reduce these 6 WGIs
into a single component, which is used as our measure of IQ. We discuss this in more
detail in section 4.4.
Table 2 presents variable definitions for the main variables in our study. These vari-
ables include measures of firm value, acquired intangibles, IQ and the set of control
variables included in our models. We discuss our empirical models in section 4.
[Insert Table 2 here]
4 Results and discussions
4.1 Descriptive statistics
In panel A of Table 3, we present descriptive statistics for measures of AIA, AGW and
OAIA (in dollars per share).19 The 25th percentile values for AIA estimates are negative
in some countries, including Kenya and South Africa. In Panel B of Table 3, we present
further details of the distribution of all variables used in the study for the sample of
African acquirers. Given that the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment gives managers more discre-
tion in deciding which intangible assets to recognize following business combinations, we
might expect to observe a significant jump in AIA after the amendment. Our preliminary
results suggest otherwise. Consistent with the results from Figure 1, acquirers appear to
rather report higher values of AIA in the pre-amendment or pre-2009 period compared
to the post-amendment or post-2009 period. Specifically, we find that the mean values of
AIA, AGW and OAIA are higher pre-2009. Also, the distribution of AIA between AGW
and OAIA appears to have changed substantially after 2009. Specifically, the median
value of AGW decreased from 0.026 to 0.000 while the median value of OAIA increased
19To mitigate the effects of possible outliers, our variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile
of the country-year distribution.
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from 0.000 to 0.001. Notice that, as shown in Table 3, AGW makes up a significantly
larger portion of AIA when compared to OAIA. The mean value of AGW is 0.234, while
the mean value of OAIA is only 0.149.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
[Insert Table 3 here]
4.2 Value relevance of AIA
Our first hypothesis (H1) predicts that recognized AIA (as per IFRS 3) are value relevant.
Hence, we explore the relationship between acquired intangibles and firm value. We use
two main empirical models to test this hypothesis. As in equation 5, our first model
explores the association between measures of AIA (i.e., AGW and OAIA) and Tobin’s Q
(as a proxy of firm value)20 after controlling for firm and industry characteristics, as well
as, prevailing external market conditions. Similar models have been used to test value
relevance in the accounting literature (see Hasso & Duncan, 2013, for a review).
V ALUEit = β0 + β1AGWit + β2OAIAit + βnCONTROLit + vt + vj + ǫit (5)
In equation 5, we control (CONTROL) for firm liquidity, leverage, free cash flow,
tangible assets, firm size and firm age, as well as, industry (j ) and year (t) fixed-effects.
If AIA is value relevant, we should observe a positive and significant coefficient for AGW
and/or OAIA when we estimate the model. Our second approach to test for value rele-
vance of AIA employs a standard Price model, which has consistently been used in the
extant accounting literature (Alali & Foote, 2012; d’Arcy & Tarca, 2018; Han & Manry,
2004; Ohlson, 1995).
Pit = β0 + β1AGWit + β2OAIAit + β3EPSit + β4BV PSit + vt + vj + ǫit (6)
20For robustness, we have also used market to book to proxy for firm value. Our results and conclusions
are similar. Hence, for conciseness we only present results for one measure (Tobin’s Q) throughout the
study.
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Here, as in equation 6, we modify the standard Price model by including measures
of acquired intangibles (AGW and OAIA) in the model.21 The model explores the re-
lationship between recognized AIA and price per share given firm-level earnings (EPS)
and book value (BVPS) per share. As in equation 5, if AIA is value relevant, we should
observe a positive and significant coefficient for AGW and/or OAIA when we estimate the
model. Equation 6 also controls for industry (j ) and year(t) fixed-effects. The inclusion
of industry fixed-effects (in these and subsequent models) removes any industry-specific
value relevance, while the inclusion of year fixed-effects controls for changing economic
and institutional conditions through time. The industry and year fixed-effects partly
address omitted variable bias in our models.
Our regression estimates for equations 5 and 6 are presented in Table 4. In Column 1,
we conduct the analysis for our full data set (including all African acquirers between 2004
and 2016) as specified by equation 5. We find that AGW and OAIA are not significantly
associated with Tobin’s Q over the full period, suggesting that firm value does not increase
with AIA. Specifically, a unit increase in AGW (or OAIA) is associated with a 0.3% (or
2.0%) increase in firm value (as measured by Tobin’s Q). In both cases, the coefficients
are not statistically significant at the 10% level. In Column 4, we use the Price model
(specified in equation 6) to again explore whether AIA is value relevant for our sample of
firms between 2004 and 2016. Here, we find that AGW is positively associated with Price
(i.e., coefficient of 0.563 and p-value of 0.846), while OAIA and Price have a negative
relationship (i.e., coefficient of -1.088 and p-value of 0.781). Again, the coefficients are not
statistically significant at the 10% level. The results from Columns 1 and 4 summarily
suggest that, over the full period (2004-2016), firm value does not generally increase with
AIA. In untabulated results, we find that AIA (the sum of AGW and OAIA) does not
have a significant positive relationship with Tobin’s Q or Price. Overall, our results do
not support our first hypothesis of a positive relation between AIA and firm value.
This finding is inconsistent with prior studies on the value relevance of intangible
21Notice that the correlation coefficient between AGW and OAIA (untabulated) is 0.04, suggesting
that there are, perhaps, no concerns about potential multicollinearity.
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assets. Indeed, Barth & Clinch (1998), Godfrey & Koh (2001) and Goodwin & Ahmed
(2006) suggest that the total reported intangible assets are value relevant to investors.
Similar to Su & Wells (2015), we explore intangibles acquired during business combina-
tions (AIA), and our results are consistent with Su & Wells (2015), who find no significant
relationship between AIA and post-acquisition firm performance. The Su & Wells (2015)
study covers the period 1988-2008 and, hence, does not cover the period after the 2008
IFRS 3 amendment. We have argued that the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment gives managers
more discretion in recognizing AIA, and hence may improve the value relevance of re-
ported AIA. In the next part of our study, we, thus, explore the impact of the 2008 IFRS
3 amendment as discussed in our second hypothesis (H2).
4.3 Value relevance of AIA and the IFRS 3 amendment
Our second hypothesis (H2) argues that the information content of AIA is more value
relevant after the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment, especially given the discretion it gives acquir-
ing managers to recognize previously unrecognized intangible assets in the acquired firm.
To test the extent to which the amendment increased the value relevance of recognized
AIA, we use standard interaction effects. Specifically, we expand equations 5 and 6 by
interacting IFRS3A with measures of AGW and OAIA. This gives rise to equations 7 and
8 below. As in previous equations (5 and 6), we control for firm characteristics, as well
as, industry (j ) and year (t) fixed-effects.
V ALUEit = β0 + β1AGWit ∗ IFRS3At + β2OAIAit ∗ IFRS3At+
β3AGWit + β4OAIAit + β5IFRS3At + βnCONTROLit + vt + vj + ǫit (7)
Pit = β0 + β1AGWit ∗ IFRS3At + β2OAIAit ∗ IFRS3At+
β3AGWit + β4OAIAit + β5IFRS3At + β6EPSit + β7BV PSit + vt + vj + ǫit (8)
19
The results we obtain from estimating these equations are presented in Columns 2, 3,
5 and 6 of Table 4. In Column 2, we find that IFRS3A has a positive interaction effect
on the AGW-Tobin’s Q, as well as, the OAIA-Tobin’s Q relationships. In both cases,
the interaction effect is statistically significant at the 10% level. In Column 3, we test
whether these results are robust to adjustment for a possible change in the pattern of im-
pairments after the amendment i.e., when AGW and OAIA are adjusted for impairments
as in equation 2a. Again, we find that the results are robust to this adjustment as the
interaction effects are significant at the 10% level. In Column 5, we explore the afore-
mentioned interaction effects using the Price model. Here, we similarly find a positive
and significant interaction effect (at the 10% level) between IFRS3A and AGW, as well
as, between IFRS3A and OAIA. As in Column 6, these results are robust to alternative
specifications of AGW and OAIA i.e., whether or not we account for potential changes in
impairments after the amendment. These results suggest that IFRS3A increases or am-
plifies the value relevance of AGW and OAIA. These results are not driven by potential
changes in the pattern of impairments after the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment.22
[Insert Table 4 here]
Overall, our results from Table 4 summarily suggest that AIA have become more rel-
evant to investors since the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment, as evidenced by a strong positive
relation between AIA and Tobin’s Q post the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment—a relationship,
which did not exist in the pre-amendment period.23 Put together, these results suggest
that AIA had a limited impact on firm value in the pre-amendment period as suggested
by Su & Wells (2015), but potentially increased firm value in the post-amendment pe-
riod. These results support our second hypothesis (H2) and provide evidence of the value
22For robustness, we also exclude Namibia from our sample (given its negative mean and median
OAIA value as shown in Table 3) and rerun the analysis. We find that the results remain qualitatively
similar.
23We establish this using an asymmetric variant of equations 5 and 6, which allows the slope coefficient
of acquired intangibles in Columns (1) and (3) to be different for the pre- and post-2008 IFRS 3 amend-
ment periods (e.g., Aktas et al., 2015). These additional results are untabulated due to space restrictions,
but are available upon request. Our results from the analyses suggest that AIA (i.e., AGW and OAIA)
was not value relevant in the pre-amendment period, but became value relevant in the post-amendment
period.
20
relevance of the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment. In particular, the results suggest that the
discretion provided to managers of the acquiring firms to recognize the previously unrec-
ognized intangible assets in acquired firms under the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment provides
value relevant information regarding intangible assets acquired during business combina-
tions. These results are robust to several empirical choices (e.g., alternative measures
and endogeneities).
4.4 Does Institutional quality matter?
Our third hypothesis (H3) contends that IQ positively moderates the value relevance of
AIA in Africa post-2008 IFRS 3 amendment. That is, post 2008 IFRS 3 amendment,
AIA is likely to be more value relevant in environments with comparatively higher IQ.
Our measure of IQ is derived from Kaufmann et al. (2010) World Governance In-
dicators (WGIs), which we discuss in section 3.2.24 As shown in Panel A of Table 5,
notice that these 6 measures, while capturing different dimensions of IQ, are highly cor-
related. Hence, we cannot include them together in our regression as this will lead to
multicollinearity problems. Consistent with Elamer et al. (2017) and Konara & Shirod-
kar (2018), we use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to reduce these six WGIs (CCI,
GEI, VAI, PSVAI, RQI and ROLI) into factors, which we use in our multivariate anal-
ysis. Our PCA results are presented in Panel B of Table 5. These results suggest that
the first principal component captures a significant proportion of the variance (89.6%)
explained by each component. The second to sixth components only capture 4.9%, 2.6%,
1.7%, 0.9% and 0.4% of the variance, respectively. Further, we find that the eigenvalue
of the first component is 5.377, while the eigenvalues for all the other components are
below 1. We, therefore, use only the first principal component as our composite measure
of IQ. Notice that instead of using PCA to generate WGIC, we could simply average the
6 WGIs for each country in each year to derive a composite measure since the measures
24Kaufmann et al. (2010) derive yearly indices, which measure; Control of Corruption (CCI), Govern-
ment Effectiveness (GEI), Voice and Accountability (VAI), Regulatory Quality (RQI), Political Stability
and Absence of Violence (PSAVI) and Rule of Law (ROLI), across countries.
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have the same scale and range (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Indeed, we do so as a robustness
check and find that our conclusions remain robust.25 In Panel C of Table 5, we present
average measures of WGIs across countries.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Our hypothesis (H3) explores the extent to which the value relevance of the acquired
intangibles pre- and post-the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment depends on the broader underlying
IQ. Specifically, we want to investigate whether the value relevance of AIA post-IFRS 3
amendment is higher in countries with comparatively better institutional environments.
In Table 6, we explore the moderating effect of IQ on the value relevance of AIA (i.e.,
AGW and OAIA) after the IFRS 3 amendment by first (Panel A) testing a three-way
interaction effect among AIA, IFRS3A and IQ as specified in equations 9 and 10.
V ALUEit = β0 + β1AGWit ∗ IFRS3At ∗ IQt + β2OAIAit ∗ IFRS3At ∗ IQt+
β3AGWit ∗ IFRS3At + β4OAIAit ∗ IFRS3At + β5AGWit ∗ IQt+
β6OAIAit ∗ IQt + β7IFRS3At ∗ IQt + β8AGWit + β9OAIAit+
β10IFRS3At + βnCONTROLit + vt + vj + ǫit (9)
Pit = β0 + β1AGWit ∗ IFRS3At ∗ IQt + β2OAIAit ∗ IFRS3At ∗ IQt+
β3AGWit ∗ IFRS3At + β4OAIAit ∗ IFRS3At + β5AGWit ∗ IQt+
β6OAIAit ∗ IQt + β7IFRS3At ∗ IQt + β8AGWit + β9OAIAit+
β10IFRS3At + β11EPSit + β12BV PSit + vt + vj + ǫit (10)
Consistent with our previous analyses, equations 9 and 10 control for firm characteris-
tics, as well as, industry (j ) and year (t) fixed-effects. Besides addressing omitted variable
bias in our models, these fixed-effects summarily control for any industry-specific value
25The two measures of WGIC are highly correlated with a correlation coefficient of 99.9%.
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relevance, as well as any world-wide macro effects. If IQ moderates our earlier results in
Table 4 (i.e., the value relevance of AGW and OAIA increase post-amendment), we should
observe a significant three-way interaction effect. Such a significant three-way interaction
effect will suggest that the moderating effect of the IFRS 3 amendment (IFRS3A) on
the acquired intangibles–firm value nexus varies across different levels of IQ. Our PCA
measure of IQ is a continuous variable. Hence, in order to facilitate the interpretation
of the three-way interaction effects, we generate a binary equivalent (High_IQ) and use
in our analysis. As noted in Table 2, High_IQ takes a value of 1 if IQ is greater than
the median IQ in that year. Our regression estimates and associated marginal effects are
presented in Table 6.
[Insert Table 6 here]
As shown in Columns 1 (Tobin’s Q equation) and 3 (Price equation) of Table 6, we find a
significant three-way interaction effect between IFRS3A, High_IQ and AGW. In Columns
3 and 4 (Price equations), we also find significant three-way interaction effects between
IFRS3A, AGW and measures of IQ. To understand the nature of these interaction effects,
we compute marginal effects which, in essence, explore the relationship between AIA and
firm value at different levels of IFRS3A and High_IQ. The marginal effects in Columns
1 and 3 suggest that, as hypothesised (H3), AGW improves firm value post-IFRS (i.e.,
IFRS3A = 1) when IQ is high (i.e., High_IQ = 1). However, the results from the Price
model (Columns 2 and 3) are inconclusive as we find that OAIA enhances firm value
after the amendment when IQ is low and that AGW also enhances firm value before the
amendment when IQ is low.
Perhaps, a more direct test of H3 is to explore H2 (i.e., Columns 2 and 5 of Table 4)
across sub-samples of firms in low and high IQ environments. Specifically, we estimate
equations 7 and 8 conditional on High_IQ being equal to zero (i.e., for firms in poor
institutional environments) and, again, conditional on High_IQ being equal to 1 (i.e., for
firms in good institutional IQ environments). We present our results for this sub-sample
analyses in Table 7. Control variables in Columns 1, 3 and 5 are suppressed to save space.
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[Insert Table 7 here]
We find that the interaction effect which we documented in Column 2 of Table 4
disappears when we focus on a sub-sample of acquirers in low IQ environment (Column 1
of Table 7). In the Price model, we find that in low IQ environments (Column 2 of Table
7), the amendment reduced the value relevance of AGW, but increased the value relevance
of OAIA. Notice that as shown in Table 2, AGW is about 1.6 times larger than OAIA
i.e., OAIA makes up a relatively smaller proportion of AIA (when compared to AGW).
In untabulated results, we therefore explore the relationship between AIA (the sum of
AGW and OAIA) and firm value across our two sub-samples. These untabulated results
confirm our findings in Column 1—the moderating effect of IFRS3A on the AIA–Tobin’s
Q relationship is not statistically significant (at the 10% level) in low IQ environments.
The untabulated results also shed light on the mixed finding in Column 2 of Table 7 by
showing that, when taken together (i.e., the sum of AGW and OAIA), the moderating
effect of IFRS3A on the AIA–Price relationship is also not statistically significant in low
IQ environments. Overall, our results from Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 suggest that the
IFRS 3 amendment does not appear to enhance the value relevance of AGW and OAIA
in poor institutional environments.
In contrast, in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7, we find that the interaction effects (between
IFRS3A and measures of AIA) are positive and significant in high IQ environments,
under both Tobin’s Q and Price models. This supports our third hypothesis (H3) that
the underlying institutional environment moderates the value relevance of AIA after the
amendment. As an additional test, we explore the extent to which the coefficients of
the interaction terms are statistically different.26 The results suggest that coefficients of
the interaction effect are generally greater when IQ is higher, particularly in the case of
IFRS3A ∗ AGW (significant at the 5% level).
Overall, our results suggest that the quality of the underlying institutional environ-
26Here, consistent with Cleary (1999), we use simulation tests and a bootstrapping procedure (10,000
bootstrapped samples) to calculate empirical p-values that estimate the likelihood of observing the
differences in coefficient estimates when the coefficients are, in fact, equal.
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ment plays an important role in shaping investors’ perceptions of the value of AIA re-
ported by acquiring managers after the IFRS 3 amendment. Investors appear to attach
more importance to managerial discretion when the underlying institutional environment
is strong. These results are consistent with our third hypothesis. The results are also
consistent with Gong et al. (2016), who find that the value relevance of intangibles, specif-
ically, R&D expenses under IFRS, is higher in European countries with stronger investor
protection. In untabulated analysis, we explore whether our results vary across different
WGI measures (CCI, GEI, VAI, PSVAI, RQI and ROLI). In essence, we run all our anal-
yses using individual WGI as measures of IQ. We find that the results and conclusions
are consistent (and do not change) across these variables. For brevity, we do not report
these additional results.
4.5 Robustness checks and additional analyses
We have addressed a number of sources of endogeneity in our analysis, including omitted
variables (through the use of year and industry fixed-effects)27, but we are left with the
issue of self-selection bias. It is possible that specific firms self-select into the acquirer sub-
sample which our study focuses on. For example, more established, larger and reputable
firms, with good analyst following are more likely to engage in mergers & acquisitions.
Thus, it is possible that the impact we report (value relevance) for acquirers is due to the
greater visibility (size, analyst following, reputation) that these firms enjoy rather than
the level of AIA reported.
In additional tests, we use the Heckman Two-Stage method (Heckman, 1979) to cor-
rect for self-selection bias. This requires us to extend our dataset to cover all listed firms
in African countries with Business Combination activity (i.e., a panel dataset). We cre-
ate a new variable, Acquirer, which takes a value of 1 if a firm completes a takeover in a
specific period and a value of 0, otherwise. In the first stage of the Heckman Two-Stage
27In untabulated results, we have also addressed reverse-causality in our Tobin’s Q model through the
use of lagged independent variables. Our results are qualitatively similar. Hence, for brevity we do not
present them here.
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model, we estimate the likelihood of making acquisitions conditional upon observed firm
characteristics using a probit model. This allows us to compute the Inverse Mills Ratio
(the non-selection hazard) following the Heckman (1979) approach. We then use the
Inverse Mills Ratio as an additional control variable in the second stage (i.e., in all our
regression models, we add the Inverse Mills Ratio as an additional control variable).
Additionally, we control for possible transition years given the fact that some firms
might have retrospectively applied the IFRS 3 amendment.28 We consider the period
from 2007 to 2010 as transition years. We create an indicator variable, Transition, which
takes a value of 1 for years between 2007 and 2010 (inclusive) and a value of 0, otherwise.
We use this variable as an additional control variable in our main analysis. In untabulated
results, we find that the coefficient of the Inverse Mills Ratio is negative and statistically
significant (at the 1% level), suggesting that our results are prone to selection bias. We
also find the coefficient of Transition to be negative and statistically significant at the
10% level in the two models. We find, however, that once we control for selection bias
(or transition years) by including the Inverse Mills Ratio (or Transition) as an additional
control variables, our main results and conclusions do not change qualitatively. Specif-
ically, we generally find a positive and statistically significant interaction effect between
IFRS3A and AGW, and between IFRS3A and OAIA after controlling for selection bias
and transition years.
One question that remains is whether our analysis actually captures the impact of
IFRS 3 and the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment. Note that IFRS 3 amendment, as an external
shock to IFRS adopters, enters our analysis as a time period (i.e., all years post-2009). It is
possible that this variable (IFRS3A) could also capture or proxy for some other external
shocks, such as external regulations impacting on all African firms, the 2008 financial
crisis or something else, which we are unaware of. To address this source of potential
endogeneity, we compare results for African countries that have adopted IFRS standards
28In the 2008 amendments to IFRS 3, the IASB permitted, but did not require firms to apply the
amendments to transactions that occurred before the effective date of the amendment, which was 1 July,
2009 (IASB, 2008).
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(adopters) against those that have not adopted these standards (non-adopters). If our
previous results are robust, then, we expect that the results (i.e., a significant change
in value relevance of intangibles post-2009) should only hold in our sample of adopters.
A number of countries in our sample, including Egypt and Tunisia, have not formally
adopted IFRS standards. Hence, we use acquirers in non-IFRS adopters (Egypt and
Tunisia), as a control to explore whether our results capture the impact of IFRS 3 rather
than some other exogenous shock, which we have not accounted for. Contrary to our
results in Table 4, here, we do not find a significant interaction effect. We also retest
this using the Price model. We find a negative and statistically significant (p-value of
0.001) interaction effect between IFRS3A and AGW for firms in non-adopting countries,
suggesting a decline in the value relevance of AGW post-2009 (which coincides with the
IFRS 3 amendment). The results for the interaction effect between OAIA and IFRS3A
are not statistically significant. Given that our results for non-adopters do not mirror
the conclusions of our results from the previous analyses, it is unlikely that our IFRS3A
measure captures different external shocks (other than the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment)
affecting all African acquirers.
In our final robustness check, we explore alternative definitions of AIA (i.e., AIA, AIA2
and AIA3). In our previous analyses, we dissociated AIA into two key components; AGW
and OAIA, and showed that our results hold when we do so. The results (not tabulated)
show that our findings hold and our conclusions do not change when we use the aggregated
measure. That is, the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment improved the value relevance of intangible
assets acquired during business combinations and this effect is stronger in countries with
strong institutional environments.
Note that our measure of AIA simply considered the difference (change) in total
intangibles pre- and post- completion of an acquisition as the value of intangible assets
acquired during the acquisition. We noted that it was possible that some of the change in
intangibles can be attributed to a firm’s routine investment in intangibles (such as through
its R&D activities). To account for this possibility of routine investment in intangibles,
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we subtracted an estimate of normal (or expected) investment in intangibles from our
measure of AIA. In the first instance, we obtain the normal investment in intangibles as
the average investment in intangibles over the previous two periods (AIA2). In the second
instance, we compute the normal investment in intangibles as the average investment in
intangibles in the previous period up until 2004 when IFRS 3 was effective (AIA3). In
both cases, we exclude years in which a firm was previously involved in acquisitions from
our analysis (so as not to inflate the expected value).
In untabulated analysis, we find that the 3 measures of acquired intangibles (AIA,
AIA2 and AIA3) are correlated. AIA2 and AIA3 are, particularly, highly correlated with a
correlation coefficient (rho) of 85.1%. Further, using difference of means (t-tests), we find
that the differences between the 3 measures are not statistically significant, suggesting
that the adjusted measures might not significantly change our results. We re-run all our
main analyses using the adjusted measures. We find that our main results hold and our
conclusions do not change across all measures of AIA. Specifically, we find that IFRS3A
positively moderates the AIA–Tobin’s Q relationship and the positive impact of IFRS3A
on the AIA–Tobin’s Q relationship is stronger in high IQ environments.
5 Conclusion
There is an open debate on the extent to which managerial discretion and latitude of
action, particularly, with respect to financial reporting, can lead to more informative
financial statements given the moral hazard that is often associated with such a discre-
tion. This issue has been explored by prior research that examine discretion in accruals
reporting and how that influences the quality of earnings estimates. Specifically, recent
years have witnessed a growth in difficult-to-value intangibles coinciding with the growth
in information technology (and related assets) and its role in business. Consequently,
as evident in the 2008 amendments to IFRS 3, standard-setters have sought to improve
the informativeness of intangible assets reported in financial statements. One of the key
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changes in the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment was to allow managers more discretion in recog-
nizing identifiable intangible assets acquired in business combinations, specifically those
which were previously unrecognized by the target company.
Besides responding to recent calls for further research into how IFRS 3 and the 2008
amendment to the standard affects the impact of business combinations on stakeholders,
our paper offers new insights on how underlying IQ impacts on investors’ perception of
the relevance of financial statement information. Specifically, we advance three related
hypotheses. Our first hypothesis explores whether recognized AIA are value relevant
under IFRS 3 (i.e., from 2004 onwards). Related to this, our second hypothesis considers
the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment and whether it increases the value relevance of AIA. We
do not find support for our first hypothesis, but find evidence to support our second
hypothesis. That is, AIA does not appear to be value relevant prior to the 2008 IFRS
3 amendment, but found to be value relevant after the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment. Given
that the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment mainly allowed managers more discretion in identifying
and valuing AIA, particularly those that were previously unrecognised by the target, we
conjecture that this discretion allows managers to prepare more informative financial
reports. Therefore, our evidence of the value relevance of AIA post-amendment, but not
pre-amendment is not consistent with the argument that managers may use discretion
to further their own interest (opportunistic behaviour). Indeed, we find a decline (rather
than an increase) in reported AIA values after the amendment.
Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the risk of moral hazard with increased managerial
discretion. We contend, therefore, that the benefit of additional managerial discretion
in financial reporting is likely to be stronger in good underlying institutional environ-
ments. That is, checks and balances in the institutional environment may act as an
added incentive for managers to refrain from opportunistic behaviour. Specifically, our
third hypothesis explores the impact of underlying IQ on the value relevance of AIA post
the 2008 IFRS amendment. Our results provide a caveat to our finding for our second hy-
pothesis that AIA has become value relevant since the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment. Indeed,
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we find that our value relevance story only holds in environments with comparatively
higher IQ, suggesting that the greater managerial discretion offered within the post-2008
IFRS amendment for recognizing previously unrecognized intangible assets in the ac-
quired firm only renders AIA value relevant within strong institutional settings. Overall,
our results suggest that the 2008 amendment has had a significant positive impact on
the quality of reported AIA. Nonetheless, this improvement only effectively translates to
more informative financial (AIA) information in the presence of strong institutions.
Our results have important regulatory and policy implications, as well as limitations.
First, evidence that the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment that offers managers greater discretion
enhances the value relevance of AIA implies that greater compliance and enforcement
regarding the uniformity in implementation and application of the standard will be a
step in the right direction, as this has the potential to enhance cross-border trade and
investment. Second, the results indicate that AIA is more value relevant in high quality
rather than low-quality institutional environments. This implies that the development
and introduction of accounting standards and reforms, such as those relating to IFRS 3
should be pursued jointly with efforts to improve the broader institutional environment
within which companies operate. In particular, national and global accounting standard-
setters, such as the International Accounting Standards Board should be conscious that
the extent to which accounting standards that are introduced are able to achieve their
objectives is also contingent on the quality of the broader institutional factors, such as
control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability and absence of vio-
lence, regulatory quality, rule of law, and voice and accountability. Therefore, efforts at
developing and introducing new accounting standards that are aimed at improving the
quality of financial reporting and information should be accompanied by similar efforts
at improving IQ, such as national governance.
Although our findings are robust and important, their limitations need to be explicitly
acknowledged. For example and like all quantitative studies of this nature, our proxies
for acquired intangible assets, price, firm value and IQ may or may not reflect practice.
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Similarly, although we have made every effort to address potential endogeneity problems,
such as reverse causality and self-selection bias that may plague our findings, it is prac-
tically impossible to eliminate such problems completely. In this regard, future studies
may offer new insights by conducting in-depth case studies by interviewing managers,
practitioners, investors, accounting standard-setters and government officials regarding
these issues. Further and as our study focuses on Africa, future studies can extend our
findings by employing data relating to other continents, such as Asia and the Middle
East. Finally, while we have suggested a simple strategy for extracting acquired intangi-
bles from reported intangibles, there is scope for future studies to explore the accuracy
of such a proxy vis-à-vis other proxies such as acquisition premiums.
31
References
Abrahams, T. & Sidhu, B. K. (1998). The role of R&D capitalisations in firm valuation
and perfor mance measurement. Australian Journal of Management, 23(2), 169–183.
AbuGhazaleh, N. M., Al-Hares, O. M. & Roberts, C. (2011). Accounting discretion in
goodwill impairments: Uk evidence. Journal of International Financial Management
& Accounting, 22(3), 165–204.
Aktas, N., Croci, E. & Petmezas, D. (2015). Is working capital management value-
enhancing? Evidence from firm performance and investments. Journal of Corporate
Finance, 30, 98–113.
Alali, F. A. & Foote, P. S. (2012). The value relevance of international financial reporting
standards: Empirical evidence in an emerging market. The international journal of
accounting, 47(1), 85–108.
Amir, E. & Lev, B. (1996). Value-relevance of nonfinancial information: The wireless
communications industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 22(1-3), 3–30.
Barth, M. E. & Clinch, G. (1998). Revalued financial, tangible, and intangible assets:
Associations with share prices and non-market-based value estimates. Journal of Ac-
counting Research, 36, 199–233.
Basu, S. & Waymire, G. (2008). Has the importance of intangibles really grown? and if
so, why? Accounting and Business Research, 38(3), 171–190.
Beattie, V. (2005). Moving the financial accounting research front forward: the uk con-
tribution. The British Accounting Review, 37(1), 85–114.
Bertrand, M., Mehta, P. & Mullainathan, S. (2002). Ferreting out tunneling: An applica-
tion to indian business groups. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1), 121–148.
Bova, F. & Pereira, R. (2012). The determinants and consequences of heterogeneous IFRS
compliance levels following mandatory IFRS adoption: Evidence from a developing
country. Journal of International Accounting Research, 11(1), 83–111.
Bowen, R. M., Rajgopal, S. & Venkatachalam, M. (2008). Accounting discretion, cor-
32
porate governance, and firm performance. Contemporary Accounting Research, 25(2),
351–405.
Chambers, D., Jennings, R. & Thompson, R. B. (2003). Managerial discretion and
accounting for research and development costs. Journal of Accounting, Auditing &
Finance, 18(1), 79–114.
Cleary, S. (1999). The relationship between firm investment and financial status. The
Journal of Finance, 54(2), 673–692.
Collins, D. W., Maydew, E. L. & Weiss, I. S. (1997). Changes in the value-relevance
of earnings and book values over the past forty years. Journal of Accounting and
Economics, 24(1), 39–67.
Dahmash, F. N., Durand, R. B. & Watson, J. (2009). The value relevance and reliability
of reported goodwill and identifiable intangible assets. The British Accounting Review,
41(2), 120–137.
d’Arcy, A. & Tarca, A. (2018). Reviewing IFRS goodwill accounting research: Implemen-
tation effects and cross-country differences. The International Journal of Accounting,
53(3), 203–226.
Dechow, P., Ge, W. & Schrand, C. (2010). Understanding earnings quality: A review
of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences. Journal of Accounting and
Economics, 50(2-3), 344–401.
Deloitte (2008). Business combinations and changes in ownership interests: A guide
to the revised IFRS 3 and IAS 27. https://www.iasplus.com/en/binary/dttpubs/
0807ifrs3guide.pdf. Last accessed on 30-10-2019.
Demski, J. S., Patell, J. M. & Wolfson, M. A. (1984). Decentralized choice of monitoring
systems. The Accounting Review, 59(1), 16.
Dong, J. & Gou, Y.-n. (2010). Corporate governance structure, managerial discretion,
and the r&d investment in china. International Review of Economics & Finance, 19(2),
180–188.
Elamer, A. A., Ntim, C. G. & Abdou, H. A. (2017). Islamic governance, national gov-
33
ernance, and bank risk management and disclosure in mena countries. Business &
Society (p. 0007650317746108).
Ellis, K. M., Lamont, B. T., Reus, T. H. & Faifman, L. (2015). Mergers and acquisitions
in africa: A review and an emerging research agenda. Africa Journal of Management,
1(2), 137–171.
Eloff, A.-M. & de Villiers, C. (2015). The value-relevance of goodwill reported under
IFRS 3 versus IAS 22. South African Journal of Accounting Research, 29(2), 162–176.
Godfrey, J. & Koh, P.-S. (2001). The relevance to firm valuation of capitalising intangible
assets in total and by category. Australian Accounting Review, 11(24), 39–48.
Gong, J. J., Sophia, I. & Wang, L. (2016). Changes in the value relevance of research
and development expenses after IFRS adoption. Advances in accounting, 35, 49–61.
Goodwin, J. & Ahmed, K. (2006). Longitudinal value relevance of earnings and intangible
assets: Evidence from australian firms. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing
and Taxation, 15(1), 72–91.
Hadani, M., Dahan, N. M. & Doh, J. P. (2015). The ceo as chief political officer: Manage-
rial discretion and corporate political activity. Journal of Business Research, 68(11),
2330–2337.
Hamberg, M. & Beisland, L.-A. (2014). Changes in the value relevance of goodwill
accounting following the adoption of IFRS 3. Journal of International Accounting,
Auditing and Taxation, 23(2), 59–73.
Hamberg, M., Paananen, M. & Novak, J. (2011). The adoption of IFRS 3: The effects of
managerial discretion and stock market reactions. European Accounting Review, 20(2),
263–288.
Hambrick, D. C. & Abrahamson, E. (1995). Assessing managerial discretion across indus-
tries: A multimethod approach. Academy of Management Journal, 38(5), 1427–1441.
Han, B. H. & Manry, D. (2004). The value-relevance of r&d and advertising expenditures:
Evidence from korea. The International Journal of Accounting, 39(2), 155–173.
Hasso, T. & Duncan, K. (2013). Valuation of family firms: the limitations of accounting
34
information. Australian Accounting Review, 23(2), 135–150.
Heckman, J. J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica:
Journal of the Econometric Society, 47(1), 153–161.
Higson, C. (1998). Goodwill. The British Accounting Review, 30(2), 141–158.
Holthausen, R. W. & Watts, R. L. (2001). The relevance of the value-relevance literature
for financial accounting standard setting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31(1-
3), 3–75.
IASB (2008a). Business Combinations: International Financial Reporting Standard 3.
International Accounting Standards Board.
IASB (2008b). Iasb issues standards on business combinations, goodwill and intangible as-
sets. https://www.iasplus.com/en/binary/pressrel/2004pr06.pdf. Last accessed
on 30-10-2019.
IFRS-Foundation (2019). Who uses IFRS standards? https://www.ifrs.
org/use-around-the-world/use-of-ifrs-standards-by-jurisdiction/. Last ac-
cessed on 05-11-2019.
Joos, P. & Lang, M. (1994). The effects of accounting diversity: Evidence from the
european union. Journal of Accounting Research, 32, 141–168.
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2010). The worldwide governance indicators:
Methodology and analytical issues (world bank policy research working paper no. 5430).
Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Konara, P. & Shirodkar, V. (2018). Regulatory institutional distance and mncs’ sub-
sidiary performance: climbing up vs. climbing down the institutional ladder. Journal
of International Management, 24(4), 333–347.
Kothari, S. (2001). Capital markets research in accounting. Journal of Accounting and
Economics, 31(1-3), 105–231.
Mergermarket (2016). Deal drivers africa 2016. https://www.mergermarket.com/info/
deal-drivers-africa-2016. Last accessed on 30-10-2019.
Morck, R., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. W. (1990). Do managerial objectives drive bad
35
acquisitions? The Journal of Finance, 45(1), 31–48.
Ntim, C. G., Opong, K. K. & Danbolt, J. (2012). The relative value relevance of share-
holder versus stakeholder corporate governance disclosure policy reforms in south africa.
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 20(1), 84–105.
Ohlson, J. A. (1995). Earnings, book values, and dividends in equity valuation. Contem-
porary Accounting Research, 11(2), 661–687.
Oliveira, L., Rodrigues, L. L. & Craig, R. (2010). Intangible assets and value relevance:
Evidence from the portuguese stock exchange. The British Accounting Review, 42(4),
241–252.
Perotti, P. & Windisch, D. (2017). Managerial discretion in accruals and informational
efficiency. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 44(3-4), 375–416.
Powell, S. (2003). Accounting for intangible assets: current requirements, key players and
future directions. European accounting review, 12(4), 797–811.
PWC (2008). IFRS 3 (revised): Impact on earnings. the crucial Q&A for decision-makers.
https://www.pwc.ru/en/ifrs/assets/ifrs3r.pdf. Last accessed on 30-10-2019.
Samaha, K., Dahawy, K., Hussainey, K. & Stapleton, P. (2012). The extent of corporate
governance disclosure and its determinants in a developing market: The case of egypt.
Advances in Accounting, 28(1), 168–178.
Schipper, K. (1989). Earnings management. Accounting horizons, 3(4), 91.
Shahwan, Y. (2004). The australian market perception of goodwill and identifiable in-
tangibles. Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR), 20(4).
Sirén, C., Patel, P. C., Örtqvist, D. & Wincent, J. (2018). Ceo burnout, managerial
discretion, and firm performance: The role of ceo locus of control, structural power,
and organizational factors. Long Range Planning, 51(6), 953–971.
Skinner, D. J. (2008). Accounting for intangibles–a critical review of policy recommen-
dations. Accounting and Business Research, 38(3), 191–204.
Su, W. H. & Wells, P. (2015). The association of identifiable intangible assets acquired and
recognised in business acquisitions with postacquisition firm performance. Accounting
36
& Finance, 55(4), 1171–1199.
Subramanyam, K. (1996). The pricing of discretionary accruals. Journal of Accounting
and Economics, 22(1-3), 249–281.
Tan, H.-C. & Jamal, K. (2006). Effect of accounting discretion on ability of managers to
smooth earnings. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 25(5), 554–573.
Tucker, J. W. & Zarowin, P. A. (2006). Does income smoothing improve earnings infor-
mativeness? The Accounting Review, 81(1), 251–270.
Tunyi, A. A. & Ntim, C. G. (2016). Location advantages, governance quality, stock
market development and firm characteristics as antecedents of african M&As. Journal
of International Management, 22(2), 147–167.
Tunyi, A. A., Ntim, C. G. & Danbolt, J. (2019). Decoupling management inefficiency:
Myopia, hyperopia and takeover likelihood. International Review of Financial Analysis,
62, 1–20.
Verrecchia, R. E. (1986). Managerial discretion in the choice among financial reporting
alternatives. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 8(3), 175–195.
Verrecchia, R. E. (2001). Essays on disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics,
32(1-3), 97–180.
Wyatt, A. (2005). Accounting recognition of intangible assets: theory and evidence on
economic determinants. The Accounting Review, 80(3), 967–1003.
37
Figures
Figure 1: Acquired Intangible Assets and M&A Activity by Year
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Tables
Table 1: Sample of acquirers by country
This table summarises acquisition activity across the countries in our sample. It presents the
number of acquirers (bids), proportion of acquirers contributed by each country and each country’s
year of IFRS adoption. It also reports the average institutional quality (Mean IQ) computed as
the mean of a country’s World Governance Indicators (WGI) scores for the period 2004-2016.
Bid announcements IFRS Adoption Institutional quality
Market Bids Percent of sample Year (Mean IQ)
Kenya 18 2.99 2002 -0.664
Mauritius 12 1.99 2005 0.823
Morocco 30 4.98 2004 -0.317
Namibia 1 0.17 2005 0.334
Nigeria 24 3.98 2010 -1.112
S.Africa 517 85.74 2005 0.275
Zambia 1 0.17 2005 -0.258
Total 603 100.00 Mean -0.113
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Table 2: Definition of variables
Proxies Variable Description and construction
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q The sum of book value of debt and market value of equity
deflated by the book value of total assets.




The difference in an acquirer’s total intangible assets (net
of impairments) pre- and post-acquisition, deflated by
opening period number of shares.
AIA2 Acquired intangible
assets 2




AIA less average increase in intangibles in previous years
starting from 2004.
AGW Acquired goodwill The difference in an acquirer’s total goodwill (net of im-
pairments) pre- and post acquisition, deflated by opening
period number of shares.
OAIA Other acquired
intangible assets
The difference between AIA and AGW.
IFRS3A 2008 IFRS 3
amendment
An indicator variable which takes a value of 1 when year
is greater than 2009 and a value of zero when year is less
than 2009.
IQ Institutional quality IQ is a composite measure of institutional quality de-
rived through Principal Component Analysis (PCA). In-
put variables include Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI); Control of Corruption index (CCI), Government
Effectiveness Index (GEI), Voice and Accountability In-
dex (VAI), Regulatory Quality Index (RQI), Political
Stability and Absence of Violence Index (PSAVI) and








Firm-years with IQ less than the median IQ in each year.
BVPS Book value per share Book value of equity deflated by opening period number
of shares.
EPS Earnings per share Net earnings deflated by opening period number of
shares.
LIQ Liquidity The ratio of cash and short term securities to total assets.
LEV Leverage The ratio of total debt to total assets.
FCF Free cash flow Net cash flow from operations less capital expenditures,
as a ratio of total assets.
TANG Tangible assets The ratio of property, plant and equipment to total as-
sets.
SIZE Firm size Natural log of total assets.
AGE Firm age The natural log of the number of years since listing.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Panel A of the table presents descriptive statistics for measures of acquired intangible assets (AIA),
acquired goodwill (AGW) and other acquired intangible assets (OAIA) across different markets.
Panel B of the table presents descriptive statistics on the cross-section of dependent and independent
variables used in the study. Variables are fully defined in Table 2. The suffixes; “pre2009” and
“post2009”, indicate results for the period prior to and after the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment (i.e., 2004
to 2008 and 2010-2016), respectively.
Panel A: Acquired intangible assets
AIA AGW OAIA
Market Mean p25 p50 p75 Mean Median Mean Median
Kenya 0.257 -0.001 0.003 0.029 0.200 0.000 0.058 0.001
Mauritius 1.010 0.016 0.022 0.032 0.009 0.002 1.001 0.010
Morocco 3.059 0.074 0.574 4.521 2.096 0.096 0.963 0.087
Namibia 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.034 0.034 -0.012 -0.012
Nigeria 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.000
S.Africa 0.202 -0.005 0.016 0.183 0.134 0.003 0.098 0.000
Total 0.357 -0.002 0.016 0.204 0.234 0.002 0.149 0.000
Panel B: Dependent and independent variables
N Mean p25 p50 p75
AIA_pre2009 140 0.550 0.000 0.042 0.387
AIA_2009 51 0.377 -0.001 0.046 0.260
AIA_post2009 330 0.272 -0.007 0.005 0.156
AIA_All 521 0.357 -0.002 0.016 0.204
AGW_pre2009 140 0.435 0.000 0.026 0.207
AGW_2009 51 0.067 0.000 0.009 0.114
AGW_post2009 330 0.178 -0.006 0.000 0.046
AGW_All 521 0.236 -0.001 0.003 0.082
OAIA_pre2009 140 0.194 -0.012 0.000 0.077
OAIA_2009 51 0.313 -0.025 0.000 0.113
OAIA_post2009 330 0.105 -0.008 0.001 0.064
OAIA_All 521 0.149 -0.011 0.000 0.068
Price 521 10.305 0.410 2.170 8.990
Tobin’s Q 521 1.555 1.040 1.296 1.792
BVPS (Book value per share) 521 19.792 0.509 1.897 8.115
EPS (Earnings per share) 521 0.673 0.027 0.168 0.691
LIQ (Liquidity) 521 0.100 0.027 0.065 0.142
LEV (Leverage) 521 0.211 0.088 0.182 0.303
FCF (Free cash flow) 513 0.022 -0.012 0.026 0.070
TANG (Tangible assets) 519 0.302 0.050 0.194 0.513
SIZE (Firm size) 521 20.374 18.715 20.331 21.843
AGE (Firm age) 521 2.392 1.946 2.708 3.045
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Table 4: Acquired intangibles and firm value
This table illustrates the effect of the IFRS 3 amendment (IFRS3A) on the value relevance of
acquired goodwill (AGW) and other acquired intangible assets (OAIA). Columns 1 and 4 explore
the relationship between AGW, OAIA and firm value over the full period (2004-2016). Columns 2,
3, 4 and 5 test the extent to which IFRS3A moderates the value relevance of AGW and OAIA. In
Columns 2 and 5 [3 and 6], AGW (and consequently, OAIA) is derived from equation 2 [2a]. All
models control for firm characteristics, industry and year fixed-effects. All variables are fully defined
in Table 2. We conduct two-tailed tests of significance. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance
at the 1% (p-value<0.01), 5% (0.01≤p-value<0.05) and 10% (0.05≤p-value<0.1) levels, respectively.
Tobin’s Q Price
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AGW 0.003 -0.029 -0.026 0.563 1.287 1.234
(0.844) (0.260) (0.305) (0.846) (0.140) (0.168)
OAIA 0.020 0.009 0.007 -1.088 -5.549*** -5.479***
(0.623) (0.858) (0.891) (0.781) (0.007) (0.007)
IFRS3A -0.023 -0.031 52.736 53.091
(0.862) (0.811) (0.123) (0.122)
IFRS3A*AGW 0.102** 0.104** 3.467** 4.129**
(0.024) (0.028) (0.035) (0.012)
IFRS3A*OAIA 0.168* 0.171* 10.322*** 10.318***
(0.087) (0.082) (0.000) (0.000)
LIQ 0.434 0.454 0.456
(0.399) (0.376) (0.373)
LEV 0.372 0.354 0.354
(0.361) (0.386) (0.387)
FCF 2.014*** 2.088*** 2.093***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
TANG -0.097 -0.047 -0.044
(0.726) (0.867) (0.877)
SIZE -0.007 -0.011 -0.011
(0.823) (0.731) (0.723)
AGE 0.052 0.054 0.054
(0.295) (0.277) (0.277)
BVPS 0.091 0.201*** 0.202***
(0.116) (0.000) (0.000)
EPS 11.619** 5.815*** 5.747***
(0.024) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.959** 0.866* 0.882* -46.367** -50.102 -54.396
(0.049) (0.082) (0.080) (0.024) (0.289) (0.253)
Observations 511 511 511 521 521 521
Firms 252 252 252 259 259 259
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 5: Principal component analyses
The table illustrates the derivation measures of institutional quality (IQ) from World Governance In-
dicators (WGI) (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Panel A presents pairwise correlation coefficients of WGI
for the countries in our sample. Panel B presents output from principal component analysis (PCA)
aimed at reducing WGIs into factors that can be used for subsequent analyses. Panel C presents mean
values for measures of IQ for African countries with business combinations. PCA_IQ refers to the first
component from PCA analysis. KMO is the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy.
Panel A: Correlation statistics
CCI GEI VAI RQI ROLI
GEI 0.923***
VAI 0.794*** 0.847***
RQI 0.905*** 0.968*** 0.850***
ROLI 0.891*** 0.942*** 0.805*** 0.899***
PSAVI 0.878*** 0.888*** 0.743*** 0.846*** 0.937***
Panel B: The PCA statistics
Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Comp6 KMO
CCI 0.410 -0.145 -0.429 0.766 -0.189 0.066 0.957
GEI 0.423 0.010 -0.271 -0.329 -0.085 -0.795 0.843
VAI 0.382 0.795 0.431 0.192 0.017 -0.015 0.977
RQI 0.416 0.154 -0.472 -0.400 0.406 0.505 0.870
ROLI 0.416 -0.262 0.290 -0.308 -0.690 0.321 0.865
PSAVI 0.402 -0.505 0.500 0.114 0.561 -0.070 0.881
Eigenvalue 5.377 0.293 0.153 0.104 0.051 0.022
Difference 5.085 0.140 0.049 0.053 0.029 -
Proportion 0.896 0.049 0.026 0.017 0.009 0.004
Cumulative 0.896 0.945 0.971 0.988 0.996 1.000
KMO (overall) 0.893
Panel C: Average of measures of institutional quality across countries
Market CCI GEI VAI RQI ROLI PSAVI PCA_IQ
Kenya -0.985 -0.49 -0.219 -0.247 -0.771 -1.271 -3.216
Mauritius 0.389 0.927 0.862 0.967 0.904 0.886 3.696
Morocco -0.311 -0.12 -0.684 -0.16 -0.195 -0.433 -1.472
Namibia 0.331 0.14 0.463 0.02 0.211 0.841 1.223
Nigeria -1.148 -1.065 -0.576 -0.772 -1.088 -2.024 -5.249
S.Africa 0.124 0.411 0.61 0.417 0.129 -0.044 1.084
Zambia -0.362 -0.592 -0.157 -0.473 -0.339 0.374 -1.524
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Table 6: Institutional quality and value relevance of acquired intangibles
The table illustrates the impact of country-level institutional quality (IQ) on the relation-
ship between acquired intangible assets and firm value (Tobin’s Q and Price), pre- and
post-the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment. It shows regression results on a three-way interac-
tion effect between measures of acquired goodwill (AGW), the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment
(IFRS3A), institutional quality (IQ) and measures of firm value (Tobin’s Q and Price).
In Columns 1 and 3, IQ is measured using an indicator variable which takes a value of
1, for acquirers in high IQ environments and a value of 0, otherwise. In Columns 2 and
4, IQ is measured as a continuous variable derived from principal component analysis as
explained in Table 2. Control variables (LIQ, LEV, FCF, TANG, SIZE, AGE) included
in Columns 1 and 2 are suppressed to save space. Marginal effects report the impact of
AGW and OAIA on firm value at various levels of IQ (high or High_IQ=1 versus low
or High_IQ=0) both pre- and post-the amendment. All models control for industry and
year fixed-effects. All variables are fully defined in Table 2. We conduct two-tailed tests
of significance. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1% (p-value<0.01),
5% (0.01≤p-value<0.05) and 10% (0.05≤p-value<0.1) levels, respectively.
Tobin’s Q Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IFRS3A*High_IQ*AGW 0.325** 25.734***
(0.025) (0.000)










IFRS3A*AGW 0.040 0.275*** -11.025*** 8.503***
(0.534) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
IFRS3A*OAIA -0.005 0.323 20.952*** 11.865***









IFRS3A -0.562 0.072 -9.777 9.168
(0.526) (0.931) (0.768) (0.782)
Continued on next page
44





AGW -0.041 -0.098* 12.236*** -1.148
(0.302) (0.069) (0.000) (0.159)
OAIA -0.048 -0.093 -7.677*** -5.185**





Controls YES YES NO NO
Constant 0.886 24.366 -9.933
(0.477) (0.599) (0.828)
Observations 519 511 521 521
Firms 258 252 259 259
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Marginal effects
Tobin’s Q Price
AGW OAIA AGW OAIA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IFRS3A=0, High_IQ=0 -0.041 -0.048 12.236*** -7.677***
(0.302) (0.544) (0.000) (0.006)
IFRS3A=0, High_IQ=1 -0.097 -0.151 -3.877*** -5.181*
(0.141) (0.225) (0.000) (0.050)
IFRS3A=1, High_IQ=0 -0.001 -0.053 1.211 13.274***
(0.991) (0.720) (0.516) (0.001)
IFRS3A=1, High_IQ=1 0.267** 0.104 10.832*** 1.820
(0.024) (0.353) (0.000) (0.282)
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Table 7: AIA and IFRS 3 amendment in high and low IQ environments
The table explores the impact of country-level institutional quality (IQ) on the relationship between
acquired intangible assets (AIA) and firm value (Tobin’s Q and Price), pre- and post-the 2008 IFRS
3 amendment. Columns 1 and 2 explore the moderating effect of the 2008 IFRS 3 amendment on the
relationship between of acquired goodwill (AGW), other acquired intangible assets (OAIA) and firm
value (Tobin’s Q and Price) in low IQ environments. Columns 3 and 4 explore the same relationships in
high IQ environments. The difference between the coefficients reported in Columns 1 and 3, as well as
Columns 2 and 4, is tested for significance in Columns 5 and 6. All models control for industry and year
fixed-effects, as well as, firm characteristics. Control variables (LIQ, LEV, FCF, TANG, SIZE, AGE)
included in Columns 1, 3 and 5 are suppressed to save space. All variables are fully defined in Table
2. We conduct two-tailed tests of significance. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%
(p-value<0.01), 5% (0.01≤p-value<0.05) and 10% (0.05≤p-value<0.1) levels, respectively.
Low IQ High IQ Difference
Tobin’s Q Price Tobin’s Q Price (1)-(3) (2)-(4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IFRS3A*AGW 0.061 -21.223*** 0.362*** 8.829*** -0.301 -30.052**
(0.557) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.206) (0.012)
IFRS3A*OAIA 0.013 16.215*** 0.297* 4.704** -0.284 11.511
(0.895) (0.000) (0.061) (0.037) (0.181) (0.103)
AGW 0.029 4.625* -0.107 -1.295 0.136 5.920
(0.438) (0.081) (0.103) (0.208) (0.251) (0.119)
IFRS3A -1.934*** -98.688 0.130 0.688 -2.064*** -99.376**
(0.000) (0.209) (0.882) (0.952) (0.007) (0.031)
OAIA -0.099** -8.834** -0.174 -1.003 0.075 -7.830
(0.021) (0.013) (0.166) (0.554) (0.375) (0.263)
BVPS -0.010 0.056*** -0.066
(0.824) (0.003) (0.313)
EPS 13.741*** 4.350*** 9.391
(0.000) (0.000) (0.164)
Controls YES NO YES NO YES NO
Constant 6.029*** 392.849*** 0.691 0.146
(0.000) (0.001) (0.580) (0.992)
Observations 57 57 459 464
Firms 40 40 215 219
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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